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BOTTOM OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT: SENNE V. 
KANSAS CITY ROYALS BASEBALL CORPORATION 
Kevin Togami* 
Major League Baseball (“MLB”) is a multi-billion-dollar business.  
While MLB contracts can be worth well over $300 million, there are thou-
sands of minor leaguers in the shadows of MLB making between $3000 to 
$7500 a year.  These players survive in poor living conditions, receiving sal-
aries far below federal minimum wage.  They endure years of financial strug-
gle for the marginally slim chance of playing in “The Show.” 
In Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corporation, minor leaguers 
took a stand and voiced their frustration with this unfeasible lifestyle.  They 
filed a class action lawsuit against MLB asserting claims under the Fair La-
bor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and various state wage and hour laws.  Over the 
last five years, the two parties have been battling over whether the minor 
leaguer’s claims can continue as a class action or if they must pursue their 
claims individually.  On August 16, 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, in a 2-1 split decision, certified all proposed classes by the minor 
leaguers. 
This Comment analyzes the class certification arguments of each side 
and asserts that the Ninth Circuit correctly ruled in favor of the minor league 
players.  Using both practicality and public policy, this Comment under-
scores the majority’s arguments and ultimately contends that the decision 
should be upheld if writ of certiorari were to be granted. 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.  The author would like to thank 
Professor Grace Parrish and the staff and editors of Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Re-
view, for their assistance and feedback.  He would like to acknowledge the players out there chasing 
their baseball dreams, especially his friend Christian Donahue, who inspired the selection of this 
Comment’s topic.  Most notably, he would like to thank his parents, Burt and Carol Togami, and 
his brother, Ryan Togami, for their endless love and aloha. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A Major League Baseball player has less than the blink-of-an-eye, a 
0.4 second window, to decode a pitch and swing his bat.1  In professional 
baseball history, the fastest pitch ever thrown was recorded at 105 miles-per-
hour.2  In 2019, the longest home run of the season traveled over 500 feet.3  
Major League Baseball (“MLB”) is replete with players who possess crowd-
wowing athletic traits.  Notable players like Bryce Harper, Gerrit Cole, and 
Manny Machado each have team contracts worth well over $300 million.4  
While these big-league athletes are compensated with fame and fortune, 
there are thousands of talented individuals struggling in the shadows to dig 
themselves out of financial instability.  Behind the curtain of MLB’s Minor 
League Baseball (“MiLB”) system, there are athletes receiving annual sala-
ries lower than half the amount of federal minimum wage.5  Most minor 
leaguers earn between $3000 and $7500 each year after taxes and clubhouse 
fees.6  With an income this low, dozens of players survive by squeezing into 
tiny apartments, sleeping on mattresses on dirty floors, and relying on peanut 
butter as a daily meal.7 
 
1. Brent Pourciau, Key to Improve Hitter Reaction Time, TOPVELOCITY, https://
www.topvelocity.net/key-to-improve-hitter-reaction-time/ [https://perma.cc/F22G-7PUB]. 
2. Joey Nowak, For Chapman, It’s Fast, Faster, Fastest, MLB (Aug. 4, 2014), https://
www.mlb.com/news/chapman-dominates-burns-up-radar-gun-consistently/c-87417898 [https://
perma.cc/T957-U5GU]. 
3. Statcast Leaderboard, MLB, http://m.mlb.com/statcast/leaderboard#hr-distance,r,2019 
[https://perma.cc/XM7M-ZZE9]. 
4. David Atler, Where Do Strasburg, Cole, Rendon Contracts Rank?, MLB (Dec. 16, 
2019), https://www.mlb.com/news/largest-contracts-in-mlb-history-c300060780 [https://perma.cc
/RE9S-L8JC].  
5. Compare Minimum Wage, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http:// https://www.dol.gov/agencies
/whd/minimum-wage [https://perma.cc/Z4J9-YTK9] (making $7.25 an hour amounts to roughly 
$15,000 a year), with Theodore McDowell, Changing the Game: Remedying the Deficiencies of 
Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption in the Minor Leagues, 9 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 2 (2018) 
(noting that minor leaguers earn less than $10,000 a year). 
6. McDowell, supra note 5, at 2. 
7. Id. at 3. 
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MLB has a history of underpaying its workers,8 and minor leaguers are 
among other victims who have been exploited by the harsh pay practices of 
MLB.  Minor leaguers assert “many—if not most” players fall “below the 
federal poverty line,”9 making less than half the pay of fast food workers 
around the United States.10  Since 1976, big league salaries have increased 
over 2000%, while minor league salaries have only risen 75%.11  When fac-
toring in inflation, minor leaguers actually earn less today than they did in 
1976.12  Jared Eichelberger, a former minor leaguer, recalled doing whatever 
he could to eat because “it was almost survival.”13   
 
8. See Behrens v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., No. 18-cv-03077-PAE, 2019 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 114628 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2019); Jon Steingart, Major League Baseball Subsidiary Agrees 
to $1.3M Wage Settlement, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 7, 2019, 1:06 PM), https://news.bloomber-
glaw.com/daily-labor-report/major-league-baseball-subsidiary-agrees-to-1-3m-wage-settlement 
[https://perma.cc/7KFQ-RMYL] (highlighting that MLB paid “$1.275 million to settle a lawsuit 
alleging it underpaid workers who handle[d] video of games.”). 
9. Second Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violations of Federal and State Wage and 
Hour Laws at 28, Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 315 F.R.D. 523, 536 (N.D. Cal. 
2016) (No. 14-cv-00608-JCS) [hereinafter Senne Complaint]; Annual Update of the HHS Poverty 
Guidelines, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. (January 17, 2020), https://www.govinfo.gov
/content/pkg/FR-2020-01-17/pdf/2020-00858.pdf [https://perma.cc/66J9-82UL] (identifying the 
2020 federal poverty line as $12,760 for a one-person household, and $17,240 for a two-person 
household). 
10. Ted Burg, Most Minor League Ballplayers Earn Less Than Half As Much Money As 
Fast-food Workers, USA TODAY SPORTS: FOR THE WIN (Mar. 6, 2014, 3:25 PM), https://ftw.usato-
day.com/2014/03/minor-leaguers-working-poor-lawsuit-mlb-bud-selig [https://perma.cc/8YA7-
FU2C] (“[F]ast food workers typically earn between $15,000 and $18,000 a year, or about two or 
three times what minor league players make.”). 
11. Brandon Sneed, This Is What It’s Like to Chase Your Pro Baseball Dreams. . .For 12 
Bucks an Hour, BLEACHER REPORT (Apr. 3, 2017), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2700299-
this-is-what-its-like-to-chase-your-pro-baseball-dreamsfor-12-bucks-an-hour [https://perma.cc
/DXA3-5DDE]; see McDowell, supra note 5, at 3. 
12. Sneed, supra note 11; see McDowell, supra note 5, at 3. 
13. Michelle Hartman, For Some Minor League Baseball Players, Wages Can Seem Like 
Peanuts, MARKETPLACE (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.marketplace.org/2018/04/05/minor-league-
baseball-draws-fans-and-dispute-over-pay/ [https://perma.cc/XF66-WWY2]; Sneed, supra note 
11. 
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Some could argue that this poor lifestyle is the price players must pay 
to have an opportunity to make millions of dollars.14  However, with MLB 
bringing in a record $10.7 billion in 2019 alone, it would not necessarily 
break their bank to pay minor leaguers a salary consistent with federal min-
imum wage.15  In 2019 alone, over 1200 players were drafted.16  Among these 
draftees, more than 80% of them will never make it to the big leagues.17  For 
the players that do, it takes 4–6 years for most players in the minor leagues 
to make it to the highest level.18  Therefore, many minor leaguers who fail to 
reach the majors find themselves years older with broken dreams and little 
money.  For players that stay in the minor leagues hoping for their shot, they 
routinely put in sixty-hour work weeks, yet receive no overtime pay or com-
pensation for the rigorous training they do in preparation for their seasons.19 
MLB does not have a sense of urgency to change their pay practices 
because they maintain legal dominance over minor league players.  MLB 
exploits minor leaguers through the use of strict contracts, its antitrust ex-
emption, and the newly passed Save America’s Pastime Act (“SAPA”).20  
Under the antitrust law exemption, MLB can keep minor league wages low 
because it has absolute authority over the terms of minor league contracts 
 
14. See, e.g., Hartman, supra note 13 (remarks of sports lawyer, Kenneth Shropshire, noting 
that it is a “luxury to be a professional baseball player” and there is “an upside if . . . [players] are 
successful in the end.”). 
15. Maury Brown, Breaking Down MLB’s New 2017-21 Collective Bargaining Agreement, 
FORBES (Nov. 30, 2016, 11:10 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2016/11/30/break-
ing-down-mlbs-new-2017-21-collective-bargaining-agreement/#1772437b11b9 [https://perma.cc
/PS58-PLP3]. 
16. J.J. Cooper, How Many MLB Draftees Make It to the Majors, BASEBALL AMERICA 
(May 17, 2019), https://www.baseballamerica.com/stories/how-many-mlb-draftees-make-it-to-
the-majors/ [https://perma.cc/5BZT-52U7]. 
17. Kent Babb & Jorge Castillo, Baseball’s Minor Leaguers Pursue Their Dreams Below 
the Poverty line, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/na-
tionals/the-minor-leagues-life-in-pro-baseballs-shadowy-corner/2016/08/26/96ab542e-6a07-
11e6-ba32-5a4bf5aad4fa_story.html [https://perma.cc/6CG5-CLBY]. 
18. Cork Gaines, Most Baseball Draft Picks Will Still Be in the Minors Four Years from 
Now, BUS. INSIDER (June 7, 2013, 1:54 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/chart-how-long-it-
takes-a-draft-pick-to-reach-major-league-baseball-2013-6 [https://perma.cc/Y2PJ-FPV4]. 
19. Id.; Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 934 F.3d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 2019); 
see also Senne Complaint, supra note 9, at 2–3, 39.  
20. See generally McDowell, supra note 5. 
TOGAMI (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/20  4:13 PM 
2020] BOTTOM OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 315 
and working conditions.21  To further strengthen their legal leverage over 
minor leaguers, MLB paid millions of dollars lobbying to pass the SAPA, 
which “formalized what has been the status quo—no overtime pay and no 
pay during spring training and the off-season.”22  SAPA protects MLB from 
legal liability for future wage disputes initiated by any minor leaguers under 
the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).23  Due to these legal barriers, 
it has become increasingly difficult for minor leaguers to establish a case for 
better work-life quality. 
In Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corporation, minor league 
baseball players across the United States took a stand and voiced their frus-
tration with their unfeasible lifestyle.24  Before the SAPA was passed, minor 
league players filed a class-action lawsuit against MLB, asserting federal 
claims under the FLSA and state wage-and-hour laws.25  The Northern Dis-
trict Court of California has yet to analyze the merits of these claims because 
the two parties are currently in a battle over whether the suit can continue as 
a class-action, or if the minor leaguers must bring separate, individual claims 
for recovery.26  The minor leaguers aimed to certify classes in Florida, Ari-
zona, and California.27  Because players and teams involved were from var-
ious states across the country, the court used the governmental interest test 
to decide whether an entanglement of state laws would prevent the class from 
being certified.28  Initially, the district court certified the California class, but 
 
21. Sneed, supra note 11. 
22. Tom Goldman, Fight Against Low, Low Pay in Minor League Baseball Continues De-
spite New Obstacles, NPR (Aug. 3, 2018, 5:38 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/03/635373608
/fight-against-low-low-pay-in-minor-league-baseball-continues-despite-new-obstacl [https://
perma.cc/GCR4-AH2Z]. 
23. Nathaniel Grow, The Save America’s Pastime Act: Special-Interest Legislation Epito-
mized, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 1013, 1015 (2019). 
24. See generally Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 934 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 
2019). 
25. Id. at 924. 
26. See generally 934 F.3d 918. 
27. See Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., No. 14-cv-00608-JCS, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 32949, at *10–11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2017). 
28. Senne, 934 F.3d at 928.   
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not the Arizona or Florida class.29  On appeal by both MLB and the minor 
leaguers, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that this entanglement 
did not prevent class certification, so it certified all three proposed classes.30 
Using the governmental interest test to resolve the choice-of-law issue, 
the Ninth Circuit weighed the interests of each player and team’s home state 
against the interests of the state where the work took place.31  Controver-
sially, the court was split in its decision.32  The majority certified each class 
because, in selecting which state law would apply, the court held that the 
interests of the other states were not superior to the state where players 
worked.33  In her dissenting opinion, Justice Sandra Ikuta critiqued the ma-
jority’s decision, highlighting flaws in the majority’s interpretation of how 
the governmental interest test should be applied.34 
This Comment asserts that the Ninth Circuit correctly certified each 
proposed class for three reasons.  First, the majority’s approach to choice-of-
law principles avoids complications arising from the entanglement of state 
laws.  Second, in balancing the burdens placed on the players, the teams, and 
the overall judicial system, the majority’s general principle is more practical 
than the strict principle called for by the dissenting opinion.  Third, public 
policy favors class certification because if the class is broken into individu-
alized claims, some minor leaguers will not have a remedy in court for 
MLB’s exploitation of their time and services.  For these three reasons, the 
Ninth Circuit correctly decided to keep the minor leaguers’ class action law-
suit alive. 
In Part II, this Comment explores MLB’s infrastructure, minor league 
pay, and MLB’s established legal advantages in order to illustrate why the 
minor league players filed their lawsuit.  Part III provides the legal frame-
work the Ninth Circuit used for choice-of-law issues, federal class certifica-
tion, and the FLSA’s collective certification.  In Part IV, this Comment walks 
through the procedural history of the Senne decision and the reasoning used 
by the majority and dissenting opinions.  Part V analyzes the Ninth Circuit 
 
29. See generally Senne, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32949. 
30. Senne, 934 F.3d at 928.   
31. Id. at 928, 936. 
32. See generally 934 F.3d 918. 
33. See id. at 936–37.  
34. See generally id. at 951–63 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
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ruling, bolsters the reasoning behind the majority opinion, and highlights 
flaws in the dissenting opinion, while concluding that the case holding was 
correct.  If MLB files for appeal and the Supreme Court of the United States 
grants a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court should rule in favor of the mi-
nor leaguers and maintain the certifications of each class. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Major League Baseball System 
“MLB is an unincorporated association whose members are the thirty 
MLB Clubs named as defendants” in Senne.35  Each MLB club is affiliated 
with several Minor League Baseball teams, which are organized into levels 
based on the skills and experiences of the players.36  MLB and its thirty fran-
chise teams rely on their minor league system, which has nearly 200 affiliate 
teams across the country, employing around 6000 players.37 
MLB’s rules govern all minor league teams, coaches, and players.38  
The rules control the terms of work for both minor and major league play-
ers.39  Under these rules, each minor league team must “use the same uniform 
player contract (“UPC”) when signing these previously amateur [minor 
 
35. MAJOR LEAGUE AGREEMENT OF 1921, ART. II, § 1 [hereinafter MAJOR LEAGUE 
AGREEMENT], https://ipmall.law.unh.edu/sites/default/files/hosted_resources/SportsEntLaw_In-
stitute/League%20Constitutions%20&%20Bylaws/MLConsititutionJune2005Update.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7PLV-BT9N]; see OFFICIAL BASEBALL RULES, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 1.01 (2019), 
https://img.mlbstatic.com/mlb-images/image/upload/mlb/ub08blsefk8wkkd2oemz.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2GUD-CZ4L] (“Baseball is a game between two teams of nine players each, under direc-
tion of a manager, played on an enclosed field in accordance with these rules, under jurisdiction of 
one or more umpires.”). 
36. MAJOR LEAGUE RULES, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL § 51(A)–(B) (2019), https://regis-
tration.mlbpa.org/pdf/MajorLeagueRules.pdf [https://perma.cc/VL5A-ECQB] (“Each Minor 
League shall be classified as a Class AAA, Class AA, Class A, Short-Season A or Rookie 
League.”). 
37. Senne, 934 F.3d at 923 (majority opinion); Senne Complaint, supra note 9, at 29 (esti-
mating “that, at any given time, the Defendants collectively employ around 6,000 minor leaguers 
total.”).  
38.  See generally MAJOR LEAGUE RULES, supra note 36. 
39. Id. 
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league] players.”40  UPCs last for seven years, giving MLB teams exclusive 
rights over players during the duration of the contract.41  Under these agree-
ments, first-year players are paid a salary of “$1,100 per month” during the 
championship season, which lasts approximately five months out of the 
year.42  For the remainder of the seven months, the players are not compen-
sated.43  Although athletes are only compensated within this five-month sea-
son, the UPC imposes duties on minor leaguers that last throughout the cal-
endar year.44 
The UPC implicitly requires all players to participate in training outside 
the championship season and maintain a professional athlete’s physical con-
dition year-round.45  Every March, Minor League Baseball teams conduct 
spring training in Arizona and Florida, where all thirty MLB franchises op-
erate minor league training.46  The UPC implies spring training is manda-
tory,47 even though virtually all players are not compensated if they choose 
 
40. Senne Complaint, supra note 9, at 32 (analyzing MAJOR LEAGUE RULES, supra note 
36, § 3(b)). 
41. See MAJOR LEAGUE RULES, supra note 36, § 3(b). 
42. Senne Complaint, supra note 9, at 2, 35. 
43. See MAJOR LEAGUE RULES, supra note 36, art. VII.B (“The obligation to make such 
payments to Player shall start with the beginning of Club’s championship playing season . . . . The 
obligation to make such payments shall end with the termination of Club’s championship playing 
season . . . .”). 
44. Id. (obligating players to “perform professional services on a calendar year basis, re-
gardless of the fact that salary payments are to be made only during the actual championship playing 
season.”). 
45. Id. art. VI.D (“Club may require Player to maintain Player’s playing condition and 
weight during the off-season . . . .”); id. art. XII (maintaining that “[p]layer agrees to . . . keep in 
first-class condition”). 
46. Senne, 934 F.3d at 923; see Senne Complaint, supra note 9, at 4 n.12 (stating all teams 
“maintain spring training sites in Florida and Arizona.”).  
47. Senne, 934 F.3d at 923; see MAJOR LEAGUE RULES, supra note 36, art. VI.B (“Player’s 
duties and obligations under this Minor League Uniform Player Contract continue in full force and 
effect throughout the calendar year, including . . . Club’s training season.”). 
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to participate.48  Spring training lasts approximately four weeks,49  and once 
it concludes, some players are assigned to minor league teams while others 
stay back until the end of June for “extended spring training.”50  Many play-
ers receive zero pay throughout extended spring training because it happens 
before the championship season starts.51  Additionally, after the champion-
ship season ends, some players are selected to play in “instructional 
league[s]” for an additional month of games.52  Similar to spring training, 
“the UPC strongly implies that participation in these leagues is required,” 
although players are again not compensated for participating.53  From the 
moment they sign with a team, these players believe they have no choice but 
to participate in the unpaid training because passing on these opportunities 
could hinder their chances of advancing to the major leagues.54   
B. The Road to the Major League 
MLB clubs acquire players through an amateur draft or free agency.55  
Every June, MLB hosts a forty-round draft where teams choose amateur 
players and receive exclusive rights to the talents of each selected player.56  
If a player is not selected through the draft, he is open to sign with an MLB 
team through free agency, which is a period of time where players not under 
 
48. See MAJOR LEAGUE RULES, supra note 36, art. VII.B (Spring Training is outside the 
championship season, so MLB does not have to pay players based on the UPC). 
49. Senne, 934 F.3d at 923; see Senne Complaint, supra note 9, at 39. 
50. Senne, 934 F.3d at 924; see Senne Complaint, supra note 9, at 37. 
51. See Senne Complaint, supra note 9, at 37 (“Upon information and belief, many of these 
players will not earn paychecks until the end of June, when the Rookie and Short-Season A leagues 
begin.”). 
52. See Senne Complaint, supra note 9, at 3 n.6 (stating that after the championship season, 
“each MLB Franchise selects around 30–45 players to participate in an instructional league to fur-
ther hone the minor leaguers’ skills. It usually lasts around one month.”). 
53. Id. at 37. 
54. See Pat Garofalo, The MLB Makes Millions on Minor Leaguers. It Refuses to Pay Min-
imum Wage., TALK POVERTY (Feb. 14, 2019), https://talkpoverty.org/2019/02/14/mlb-makes-mil-
lions-minor-leaguers-refuses-pay-minimum-wage/ [https://perma.cc/4RWM-T9WS]. 
55. See generally MAJOR LEAGUE RULES, supra note 36, §§ 4–5. 
56. Id. § 4(a)–(h). 
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contract may sign with a mutually interested team.57  Through the MLB draft, 
top picks receive multi-million dollar signing bonuses, while the remaining 
majority receive significantly less.58  Out of forty rounds, players drafted as 
early as the tenth round have received “as little as a $1,000 signing bonus.”59 
Each MLB team depends on their minor league network, holding affil-
iate contracts with multiple minor league teams spread across the following 
class levels: Rookie; Short Season A; A; A-Advanced; Double-A; and Tri-
ple-A.60  Most players typically start at the Rookie level and aim to advance 
to higher classifications as they play.61  Each organization in MLB generally 
has more than 200 minor league players under contract.62  Accordingly, there 
are approximately 6000 players in the minor leagues who are fighting to ob-
tain a spot on a major league roster.63  With around 1000 new players coming 
in from the draft every year, a late round draft pick’s chance of making it to 
the major league is very slim.64 
MLB has “direct financial control” over all levels of the minor 
leagues.65  The minimum salary for an MLB player in 2019 was $555,000.66  
On the other hand, the annual income of most minor league players is be-
tween $3000 and $7500 after taxes and clubhouse dues.67  Despite this wage 
gap, minor league franchise values “continue to appreciate, having risen 
 
57. Id. § 4(i). 
58. McDowell, supra note 5, at 3. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 6. 
61. Senne, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 991; Senne Complaint, supra note 9, at 33–34. 
62. McDowell, supra note 5, at 6. 
63. Id. at 2.  
64. Cooper, supra note 16 (showing the later a player is drafted dramatically decreases their 
odds of reaching the majors). 
65. McDowell, supra note 5, at 5. 
66. Brown, supra note 15. 
67. McDowell, supra note 5, at 2. 
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steadily even during the most recent economic recessions.”68  Minor league 
teams “are now valued as high as $49 million.”69  Although it appears that 
MLB has the funds to pay their players at least minimum wage, it has not 
taken any action because their advantages in the legal system diminish the 
need for wage changes. 
C. Major League’s Legal Dominance Over Minor Leaguers 
MLB’s control over the minor league system’s finances, rules, and con-
tracts enables MLB to operate the minor league system at a minimal cost by 
keeping player wages low.  MLB continues to have a strong grip on the pay 
of minor league players for three reasons.  First, MLB uses the language in 
its UPC to restrain minor league pay.  Second, MLB has a nearly impenetra-
ble legal defense against employment litigation due the antitrust exemption 
and advantageous federal statutes.  Third, using its abundance of money and 
wide geographical reach, MLB has further mitigated its legal risks by lobby-
ing for favorable laws that limit future litigation. 
1. Restrictions on Minor Leaguers by the UPC 
UPCs stipulate that players are “obligate[d] [to] perform professional 
services on a calendar year basis, regardless of the fact that salary payments 
are to be made only during the actual [five-month] championship playing 
season.”70  If a player refuses to sign a UPC, he would not be allowed to play 
for any major or minor league baseball club.71  Since all MLB organizations 
impose UPCs on their players, minor-league players have no leverage to ne-
gotiate.72  While an MLB club may “trade, promote, demote, or assign any 
player at-will,” the UPCs restrict a minor leaguer’s ability to move to another 
team.73  UPCs give MLB teams exclusive rights over the players’ athletic 
 
68. Id. at 6. 
69. Id. 
70. See MAJOR LEAGUE RULES, supra note 36, art. VI.B. 
71. Id. art. XXV. 
72. McDowell, supra note 5, at 9–10. 
73. Id.  
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talents for seven years.74  Though a minor leaguer “may voluntarily retire at 
any time, he cannot sign with any other domestic, Canadian, or Mexican 
team for the remaining term of his contract without the written consent of 
the MLB commissioner and the baseball club for which he is under con-
tract.”75  In addition to UPCs, MLB also reaps the legal benefits stemming 
from the antitrust exemption of the Curt Flood Act.76 
2. Antitrust Exemption: Curt Flood Act 
MLB’s exploitation of minor league players stems from its legally au-
thorized power to do so under the federal antitrust exemption.77  The antitrust 
exemption derives from judicial rulings spanning a century of cases, which 
solidified that the business of baseball does not implicate federal antitrust 
laws.78  For the antitrust exemption to be changed, congressional action is 
needed.79  In 1998, Congress passed the Curt Flood Act.80  The statute 
amended federal statutory law to assure that MLB players were subject to 
the protection of antitrust laws for any labor issues.81  However, while some 
player advocates perceived the new law as a victory, the statute explicitly 
excluded minor league players from being protected by federal antitrust 
laws.82  Accordingly, MLB is able to keep minor league wages low because 
the players are statutorily denied the ability to bring antitrust claims for con-
duct “relating to or affecting employment to play baseball at the minor league 
 
74. See MAJOR LEAGUE RULES, supra note 36, § 3(b). 
75. McDowell, supra note 5, at 9–10; see MAJOR LEAGUE RULES, supra note 36, § 14(b). 
76. See McDowell, supra note 5, at 8–10.  
77. Id. at 8.  
78. Id.; see, e.g., Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200, 208–09 (1922); 
Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284 
(1972). 
79. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 282–83.  
80. Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2012).  
81. See id. § 26b(a). 
82. See id. § 26b(c) (“Only a major league baseball player has standing to sue under this 
section.”). 
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level.”83  With no antitrust protection, the minor leaguers alternatively turn 
to the FLSA for federal minimum wage and overtime claims against MLB.84  
However, the Save America’s Pastime Act marks another roadblock to the 
minor leaguers’ pursuit for recovery.   
3. Save America’s Pastime Act and the Curtailing of Future FLSA 
Claims 
In 1938, Congress passed the FLSA in order to protect workers from 
harsh labor practices and ensure that they receive a reasonable minimum 
standard of living.85  However, while many United States citizens could em-
pathize with the wage issues minor leaguers currently face, Congress has 
recently taken precautions to reduce legislative protection for minor leaguers 
under the FLSA.86  Specifically, the Save America’s Pastime Act created an 
exemption to the FLSA that effectively excluded the minor league players 
from the statute’s minimum wage and overtime compensation require-
ments.87 
SAPA was introduced in direct response to the Senne case.88  Rather 
than adjust its minor league pay practices or simply defend the Senne lawsuit 
on its merits, MLB instead sought further legal protection “by pursuing a 
new statutory exemption excluding minor league players from the FLSA.”89  
Because the minor league system is made up of more than 160 teams spread 
across forty-two states, MLB assumes influential power over many congres-
sional representatives throughout the country.90  Since minor league players 
never unionized, they were incapable of fighting back against MLB’s 
 
83. Id. § 26b(b)(1). 
84. See generally Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–216 (2012); see generally 
Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 934 F.3d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Senne 
Complaint, supra note 9, at 82. 
85. See 29 U.S.C. § 202.  
86. See McDowell, supra note 5, at 15. 
87. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(19); Grow, supra note 23, at 1015. 
88. McDowell, supra note 5, at 16. 
89. Grow, supra note 23, at 1015; see 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(19). 
90. Grow, supra note 23, at 1025. 
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powerful lobbying strategies.91  After MLB’s extensive efforts, President 
Donald Trump signed off on their requested provision in March of 2018.92  
Under the SAPA, FLSA minimum wage protection is not given to: 
[A]ny employee employed to play baseball who is compensated 
pursuant to a contract that provides for a weekly salary for 
services performed during the league’s championship season (but 
not spring training or the off season) at a rate that is not less than 
a weekly salary equal to the minimum wage … for a workweek 
of 40 hours, irrespective of the number of hours the employee 
devotes to baseball related activities.93   
Thus, players are exempt from the FLSA once they are paid the minimum 
wage amount for a forty-hour work week, leaving MLB with no requirement 
to pay any additional compensation when players work over forty hours.94  
The Save America’s Pastime Act applies on a prospective basis, so it only 
shields MLB from future liability under the FLSA.95  Therefore, Senne v. 
Kansas City Royals Baseball Corporation may be the first and last case 
where minor leaguers are able to recover for claims under the FLSA. 
III. SENNE’S LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Since Congress passed SAPA, the certification of the classes in Senne 
holds even more weight as the minor leaguers look to recover for unfair wage 
practices.  The Ninth Circuit addressed issues revolving around federal class 
certification, choice-of-law principles, and the FLSA’s collective classifica-
tion provision. 
 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 1015; see generally 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(19). 
93. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(19). 
94. Id.; Grow, supra note 23, at 1015. 
95. Grow, supra note 23, at 1030. 
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A. Obtaining Federal Class Certification 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs federal class certification 
claims.96  The Ninth Circuit opinion reviewed by this Comment focuses on 
the law of Rule 23(b)(3).97  Before analyzing Rule 23(b)(3), a party seeking 
class certification must first satisfy the four requirements delineated in Rule 
23(a): (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of 
representation.98  After a rigorous analysis, the district court held that the 
classes of minor leaguers satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a).99 
The first Rule 23(a) element, numerosity, requires that a class must be 
“so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.”100  Generally, 
courts will “find that the numerosity factor is satisfied if the class comprises 
40 or more members and will find that it has not been satisfied when the 
class comprises 21 or fewer.”101  With the presence of multiple minor league 
teams in the state of each class, which includes 25–35 players on each team, 
the district court concluded that the minor leaguers had enough members to 
establish the element of numerosity for all classes.102  
The second element, commonality, requires that there be “questions of 
law or fact common to the class.”103  The common injury may arise out of 
“shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates [or] a common core of 
salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies.”104  Because the class 
members share common issues of whether their playing seasons are 
 
96. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
97. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 928. 
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4). 
99. See Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., No. 14-cv-00608-JCS, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 32949, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2017); see also Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball 
Corp., 315 F.R.D. 523, 536 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
100. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). 
101. See, e.g., Celano v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 242 F.R.D. 544, 549 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
102. Senne, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32949, at *140; see Senne, 315 F.R.D. at 562. 
103. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
104. Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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considered “work” and if they are subject to minimum wage and overtime, 
the district court found that the commonality element is satisfied.105 
The third element, typicality, requires that “claims or defenses of the 
representative parties [be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class.”106  
Analyzing “[t]he test of typicality . . . [considers] ‘whether other members 
have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which 
is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have 
been injured by the same course of conduct.’”107  In Senne, in order to avoid 
complications arising from off-season training at different locations, the mi-
nor leaguers narrowed their class claims to work that happened within the 
championship season.108  Accordingly, the district court ruled that the minor 
leaguers’ class claims “meet the typicality requirement because they are ‘rea-
sonably coextensive with those of absent class members.’”109   
The fourth element, adequacy, requires the named representative to 
“fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”110  Even class mem-
bers who are absent “must be afforded adequate representation before entry 
of a judgment which binds them.”111  The adequacy test asks two questions: 
“(1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest 
with other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel 
prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?”112  The district court 
in Senne acknowledged that with minor leaguers working varying amounts 
of hours, some class members who worked longer might receive less com-
pensation than the potential amount from an individualized claim.113  How-
ever, the district court found that this would not impair the California class’s 
 
105. Senne, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32949, at *140. 
106. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). 
107. Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schwartz v. 
Harp, 108 F.R.D. 279, 282 (C.D. Cal. 1985)). 
108. See Senne, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32949, at *141. 
109. Id. at *140 (quoting Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020). 
110. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
111. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. 
112.  Id. 
113. Senne, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32949, at *140. 
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ability to adequately represent its members, “so long as class members are 
adequately informed of their right to opt out of the class and the potential for 
a larger recovery if they proceed individually.”114 
While the four Rule 23(a) elements are met, the Senne classes must also 
meet the criteria of Rule 23(b)(3).115  A Rule 23(b)(3) class may be certified 
if “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual class members,” and if “a class action is 
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.”116  Therefore, the minor leaguers have the burden to show a 
“predominance” element and a “superiority” element.117   
The superiority element of Rule 23(b)(3) requires that a class action be 
“superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating 
the controversy.”118  The superiority inquiry requires the court to consider 
four factors: (1) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the 
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (2) the extent and nature of any 
litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class mem-
bers; (3) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of 
the claims in the particular forum; and (4) the likely difficulties managing 
the class action.119  In Senne, the court found superiority to be satisfied be-
cause the class members did not have an interest in pursuing separate ac-
tions—that is, no other ongoing litigation was present—and the circum-
stances of the case “will not require so many individualized inquiry as to 
make it unmanageable.”120 
 
114. See id. at *141–42.  Although adequacy was found for the California class, the Arizona 
and Florida classes were denied adequacy due to choice-of-law issues.  Since adequacy and pre-
dominance were denied for the same reasons, the court addressed them collectively in its predom-
inance analysis. 
115. See id. at *143; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).  Classes must meet the 23(a) requirements 
and meet the criteria of either 23(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3).  
116. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
117. See Frieri v. Sysco Corp., No. 16-CV-1432 JLS (NLS), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207481 
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2019). 
118. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
119. Id. 23(b)(3)(A)–(D). 
120. See Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., No. 14-cv-00608-JCS, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 32949, at *171 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2017). 
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The other element of Rule 23(b)(3), predominance, is a focal point in 
the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Senne.  The predominance element focuses on 
“the relationship between the common and individual issues,” and tests 
whether proposed classes are “sufficiently cohesive to warrant a judgment 
from class representation.”121  Determining “[t]he predominance inquiry 
‘asks whether the common aggregation-enabling issues in the case are more 
prevalent or important than the non-common, aggregation-defeating individ-
ual issues.’”122  A class action like Senne, which requires the court to apply 
multiple state laws, implicates the predominance requirement of Rule 
23(b)(3).123  To find predominance, the Senne court must analyze which state 
law applies to each class.124  If the conflict between state laws is too compli-
cated and undermines the common legal question applicable to all class 
members, then predominance will not be found.125  Since an unfixable con-
flict of state laws defeats predominance, the Ninth Circuit must use choice-
of-law principles to decide if this entanglement can be fixed or not. 
B. Addressing Choice-of-Law Issues 
The Ninth Circuit uses California’s choice-of-law analysis because a 
district court considering state law claims brought in federal court must uti-
lize the choice-of-law rules of the forum state.126  By default, California 
courts would apply California law unless a party timely invokes the law of 
another state.127  The party who invokes an outside state’s laws must demon-
strate that the foreign law, rather than California law, should apply to class 
 
121. Amchem Prods. v.  Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997); Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 
150 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 1998). 
122. Tyson Foods Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016) (quoting 2 W. 
RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:50, at 196–97 (5th ed. 2012)). 
123. See Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1189–90 (9th Cir. 2001). 
124. Id. at 572. 
125. Id. at 580–81. 
126. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496–97 (1941). 
127. In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ. Litig., 926 F.3d 539, 561 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting 
Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719, 721 (1976)). 
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claims.128  This objecting party “must satisfy California’s three-step govern-
mental interest test,” which is used to resolve choice of law issues.129 
First, the court determines whether the relevant law of each of the 
potentially affected jurisdictions with regard to the particular 
issue in question is the same or different.  Second, if there is a 
difference, the court examines each jurisdiction’s interest in the 
application of its own law . . . to determine whether a true conflict 
exists [between the multiple state laws].  Third, if the court finds 
that there is a true conflict, it carefully evaluates and compares the 
nature and strength of the interest of each jurisdiction in the 
application of its own law ‘to determine which state’s interest 
would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the 
policy of the other state,’ and then ultimately applies ‘the law of 
the state whose interest would be the more impaired if its law were 
not applied.’130 
To interpret the governmental interest test, the Ninth Circuit uses the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court’s decision in Sullivan v. Oracle Corporation to guide 
them in Senne’s choice-of-law issue.131  In Sullivan, the court held that over-
time provisions apply to day-long or week-long work performed in Califor-
nia for a California employer by an out-of-state resident.132  The majority 
and dissenting opinions in Senne rely heavily on their own interpretations of 
Sullivan as reviewed in Part IV.133  In addition to federal class certification, 
the minor league players also sought to establish a collective under the 
FLSA.134 
 
128. See id. (quoting Bernhard, 546 P.2d at 721). 
129. Id. 
130. Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914, 922 (Cal. 2006) (quoting Bern-
hard, 546 P.2d at 723). 
131. Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237 (Cal. 2011); see Senne v. Kansas City Royals 
Baseball Corp., 934 F.3d 918, 929–37 (9th Cir. 2019). 
132. Sullivan, 254 P.3d at 247. 
133. See generally Senne, 934 F.3d 918; see infra Part IV. 
134. Senne, 934 F.3d at 924. 
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C. Establishing a Collective Under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
The FLSA permits employees to bring federal claims on behalf of 
“themselves and other employees similarly situated.”135  Notably, “[t]here is 
no established definition of the FLSA’s ‘similarly situated’ requirement, nor 
is there an established test for enforcing it.”136  As a result, the Senne court 
developed its own standard: 
Party plaintiffs are similarly situated, and may proceed in a 
collective, to the extent they share a similar issue of law or fact 
material to the disposition of their FLSA claims. Significantly, as 
long as the proposed collective’s ‘factual or legal similarities are 
material to the resolution of their case, dissimilarities in other 
respects should not defeat collective treatment.’137 
Courts generally use this standard, one similar to the Rule 23(b)(3) standard, 
to certify a FLSA collective.138  Due to the similarity between the minor 
leaguers’ proposed collective and their proposed classes, the Ninth Circuit 
has in effect given practically identical treatment to both groups in Senne 
when considering the impact of any choice-of-law claims.139  After the Save 
America’s Pastime Act, a statute applied on a prospective basis, the denial 
of this proposed collective would leave minor leaguers with no FLSA claims 
going forward.140 
 
135. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
136. Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090, 1111 (9th Cir. 2018).  
137. Senne, 934 F.3d at 948 (citing Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1114, 1117). 
138. Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).  
139. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 948 (rejecting defendants’ FLSA arguments with the same 
reasoning the court used to reject defendants’ Rule 23(b)(3) arguments). 
140. Grow, supra note 23, at 1030. 
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IV. SENNE V. KANSAS CITY ROYALS BASEBALL CORPORATION 
A. Procedural History 
The legal battle between minor leaguers and MLB began in 2015.141  
The players asserted claims under the federal FLSA and various state wage 
and overtime laws against MLB.142  The minor leaguers alleged that they 
were not paid during spring training, extended spring training, or the instruc-
tional leagues.143  They further alleged that minor leaguers are MLB employ-
ees and the activities the players perform throughout the calendar year con-
stitute compensable work, so MLB has unlawfully “exploited minor leaguers 
by paying salaries below minimum wage.”144  Additionally, the minor 
leaguers asserted that while they are paid little during the championship sea-
son, they routinely worked overtime without receiving compensation.145  
Hence, the minor leaguers requested certification for multiple 23(b)(3) clas-
ses for claims under the state laws of California, Florida, Arizona, in addition 
to the federal FLSA, on behalf of themselves and all persons similarly situ-
ated in the three years prior to the filing of the action.146 
On October 20, 2015, the Northern District Court of California condi-
tionally certified the minor leaguers proposed FLSA collective, defined as 
follows: 
All Minor League Baseball players employed by MLB or any 
MLB franchise under the Minor League Uniform Player Contract 
who worked or work as Minor League players at any time since 
 
141. Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 105 F. Supp. 3d 981, 991 (N.D. Cal 
2015).  
142. Id. (filing claims under the laws of California, Florida, Arizona, North Carolina, and 
New York). 
143. See generally Senne Complaint, supra note 9. 
144. Id. at 35. 
145. Id. 
146. Senne, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 992.  
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February 7, 2011, but who had no service time in the Major 
Leagues at any time of performing work as a Minor Leaguer.147 
More than 2200 minor league players opted into this FLSA collective.148  In 
response, MLB asked the court to decertify this FLSA collective on grounds 
that the minor leaguers are not “similarly situated” and the defenses they 
“plan to assert will require too many individualized inquiries to allow for 
class treatment of their claims.”149 
On July 21, 2016, the district court denied the minor leaguers’ requests 
for class certification under Rule 23 for all proposed Rule 23(b)(3) classes, 
and also decertified the FLSA collective it had preliminarily certified.150  The 
court concluded that choice-of-law issues defeated predominance because 
“(1) the winter off-season training claims entailed work performed in dozens 
of different states with no common schedule or situs; and (2) the champion-
ship season claims involved frequent travel between state lines for away 
games.”151  The district court held that the winter off-season work claims 
“fatally undermined predominance because the court would be required to 
undertake an overwhelming number of individualized inquiries in determin-
ing which activities constituted compensable ‘work’ and how much time was 
spent doing ‘work.’”152   
The minor leaguers then filed a renewed motion for class certification 
under Rule 23 and sought recertification of a narrower FLSA class.153  In a 
motion for reconsideration, they asked the court to certify a set of narrowed 
 
147. See Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., No. 14-cv-00608-JCS, 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 143011, *49 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2015). 
148. Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 315 F.R.D. 523, 530 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
149. Id. at 531. 
150. See generally id. 
151. Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 934 F.3d 918, 925 (9th Cir. 2019) (sum-
marizing Senne, 315 F.R.D. at 580–81). 
152. Id. (citing Senne, 315 F.R.D. at 577–84). 
153. See Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., No. 14-cv-00608-JCS, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 32949, at *49 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2017). 
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classes that they contend would address the concerns expressed by the court 
in the previous class certification order.154   
“[T]he district court recertified the narrowed FLSA collective and cer-
tified a California (b)(3) class[,]” ruling that “predominance and [the] ‘sim-
ilarly situated’ requirements could be met” using the narrower class defini-
tion.155  However, the court ruled opposite for the Arizona and Florida 
classes, holding that choice-of-law provisions in those states defeated pre-
dominance.156  The minor leaguers petitioned the Ninth Circuit to review the 
denial of certification for the Arizona and Florida classes, and MLB “like-
wise petitioned to appeal the certification of the California class” and FLSA 
collective.157  The Ninth Circuit granted both petitions and consolidated the 
cross-appeals into one matter.158 
B. Choice-of-law vs. Predominance: The Ninth Circuit’s View 
The Ninth Circuit first addressed whether an entanglement of state laws 
undermines the proposed Rule 23(b)(3) classes.  The district court was “split 
on the impact of choice-of-law questions” on predominance.159  It ruled that 
choice-of-law concerns did not defeat the predominance requirement for the 
California class, but held otherwise for the Arizona and Florida classes.160 
To make choice-of-law determinations, the Ninth Circuit relied on the 
California Supreme Court’s decision in Sullivan v. Oracle Corporation.161  
In Sullivan, the California Supreme Court addressed whether California’s 
overtime law applied to non-resident employees of a California corporation 
who worked primarily in their home states of Colorado and Arizona, but also 
 
154. Id. 
155. Senne, 934 F.3d at 926 (summarizing Senne, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32949, at *49). 
156. Senne, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32949, at *170. 
157. Senne, 934 F.3d at 926. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. (summarizing decision in Senne, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32949). 
160. See generally Senne, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32949. 
161. Id. at 929; see also Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237 (Cal. 2011). 
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worked in California for “entire days or weeks” at a time.162  Sullivan applied 
California’s three-step governmental interest analysis for choice-of-law 
questions: (1) whether the relevant laws in each impacted state differed; (2) 
whether a true conflict existed; and (3) “which state’s interest would be more 
impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of the other state.”163  
The Sullivan court acknowledged that there was a difference between rele-
vant laws of the impacted states.164  However, a true conflict was doubtful 
because “California . . . unambiguously asserted[] a strong interest in apply-
ing its overtime law to . . . all work performed[] within its borders.165  Even 
if there was a true conflict, applying another state’s law over California’s law 
would bring the “greater impairment.”166  Using this analysis, Sullivan ulti-
mately concluded that California law applied to all work performed for days 
or weeks at a time within the state’s borders, regardless of whether it was 
performed by residents or non-residents.167 
1. California Class 
Relying on Sullivan, the Ninth Circuit held that “California law should 
apply to the (b)(3) California class.”168  MLB argued that while Sullivan in-
volved a California corporation, “most of the MLB Club Defendants with 
affiliates in the California League are located outside California.”169  How-
ever, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Sullivan to indicate that California law 
 
162. Sullivan, 254 P.3d at 239, 243. 
163. See Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719, 723 (1976). 
164. Sullivan, 254 P.3d at 239, 243. 
165. Id. at 246 (referring to language in multiple California statutes illustrating California’s 
strong interest in applying its law to work within its borders). 
166. See id. at 247. 
167. Id. at 241, 243. 
168. Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 934 F.3d 918, 930 (9th Cir. 2019). 
169. Id. (summarizing Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellant’s Consolidated Principal 
and Response Brief, Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 934 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(Nos. 17-16245, 17-16267, 17-16276)). 
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should apply to the California class regardless of where teams were head-
quartered.170 
MLB contended that numerous states outside of California have a com-
peting interest in applying their own laws and regulating work performed in 
California.171  However, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that, like in Sullivan, 
California’s interest in applying its laws to work performed within its borders 
for days or weeks at a time still “reigns supreme” regardless of whether an-
other state expressed an interest in applying its own wage laws.172  The Ninth 
Circuit also made two additional points to bolster its conclusion.173 
First, the Ninth Circuit found that since the minor leaguers met their 
burden of showing that California law could constitutionally be applied, the 
burden then shifts to MLB “to demonstrate that foreign law, rather than Cal-
ifornia law, should apply to class claims.”174  However, MLB failed to meet 
this burden because they only speculated that claims might be subject to an-
other state’s law, which “might” impair the state’s interest more, not that it 
would.175  MLB argued that some players’ work time in California was min-
imal in light of their overall career.176  However, the court emphasized that 
despite the short time minor leaguers spent in California, they still worked 
for “entire days or weeks” at a time while in the state, just as the plaintiffs in 
Sullivan did to successfully trigger California law.177 
Second, the court highlighted the impracticality of not applying the law 
of the state where work was done to the employees who performed work in 
 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 930–31 (citing Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellant’s Consolidated Principal 
and Response Brief, supra note 169, at 47–48). 
172. Id. at 931. 
173. Id. 
174. Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 590 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wash-
ington Mut. Bank v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 320 (2001)). 
175. Senne, 934 F.3d at 931. 
176. Id. at 931–32. 
177. Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 243 (Cal. 2011). 
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that state.178  The court reasoned this would be an “unworkable scheme.”179  
Under this approach, employers would need to obtain the residency of each 
employee, adjust the wages for each employee according to their resident 
state, and actively comb through each state’s labor laws to make sure they 
abide by the specific laws applied to that employee’s work.180  Requiring that 
this tedious and difficult process be applied to each employee would create 
unfair administrative and business practices that would be detrimental to cit-
izens of states with high wage laws or strict labor laws.181 
2. Arizona and Florida Classes 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s determination that 
“choice-of-law considerations defeated predominance and adequacy [re-
quirements] for the proposed Arizona and Florida 23(b)(3) classes.”182  Us-
ing California’s three-step governmental interest analysis, the court ruled 
that Arizona law applies to work performed in Arizona and Florida law ap-
plies to work performed in Florida.183  Under the first element, the court 
found that the “differences in state law are ‘material,’ meaning that ‘they 
make a difference in litigation.’”184  For the second element, the court con-
cludes that a “true” conflict does not exist despite many arguments by 
MLB.185  On the third and final requirement, the court believed there was a 
“clear answer”: in deciding which law should apply, the interests of an alien 
state are highly unlikely to overcome the interests of the state where work is 
done.186  The court admittedly reached this conclusion without specifically 
 
178. Senne, 934 F.3d at 931–32. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 933 (summarizing decision in Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., No. 
14-cv-00608-JCS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32949 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2017)). 
183. Id.  
184. Id. (quoting Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 590 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
185. Id.  
186. Id. at 936 (citing Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 245–47 (Cal. 2011)). 
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inquiring into the interests potentially expressed by any state’s statutory lan-
guage or case law.187 
3. FLSA Collective 
The Ninth Circuit used the same logic as above to affirm the FLSA’s 
Collective certification.188  Under the FLSA standard for collective certifica-
tion, “as long as the proposed collective’s ‘factual or legal similarities are 
material to the resolution of their case, dissimilarities in other respects should 
not defeat collective treatment.’”189  “Because the FLSA collective covers 
work performed during . . . [times where] the players received no pay,” the 
court found two common legal questions that would drive litigation: (1) 
“[A]re the players employees[?]” and (2) “[D]o the activities they perform 
during those times constitute compensable work?”190  Because MLB might 
be subject to statutory violations based on whether the minor leaguers are 
permitted to perform compensable work outside of scheduled practice and 
game times, the court ultimately affirmed the FLSA collective for the minor 
leaguers’ overtime claims.191  However, although the minor leaguers’ collec-
tive and classes were ultimately certified, it was not a unanimous decision.192 
C. The Other Side of The Argument: Justice Ikuta’s Dissent 
In her dissent, Justice Ikuta argued that the framework the majority 
used to address the intersection between class certification and choice-of-
law issues created significant practical and logistical problems, and “over-
looked” California’s complex principles.193  Justice Ikuta asserted the major-
ity incorrectly drew from California’s choice-of-law analysis the general 
principle that a state has the “predominant interest in regulating conduct that 
 
187. Id.  
188. See generally id.  
189. Id. at 948 (quoting Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090, 1114 (9th Cir. 
2018)). 
190. Id. at 949.  
191. Id.  
192. See id. at 951 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
193. Id. at 951.  
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occurs within its borders.”194  The dissent argued that the simplicity of the 
majority’s holding creates a slippery slope where any class going forward 
will readily be able to be certified “without any fuss” from choice-of-law 
issues.195 
1. Choice-of-Law and Predominance Issue 
Justice Ikuta emphasized that the proposed classes are comprised of 
employees who “reside in at least 19 states, who are suing employers head-
quartered in 22 states, relating to work that took place in three different 
states.”196  Additionally, the dissent noted that UPCs contain a New York 
choice-of-law provision, so an additional state’s interest must be included in 
the complicated choice-of-law issue.197  Thus, the potentially affected juris-
dictions include: (1) Arizona and Florida, where the employees trained for 
varying lengths of time; (2) the states in which the players reside, which in-
clude at least 19 states; (3) the states in which the players’ teams are located; 
and (4) New York, the state of MLB’s headquarters and the selected law of 
the UPC’s choice-of-law provision.198 
Justice Ikuta noted that “‘when application of the law of the place of 
the wrong would defeat the interests of litigants and of the states concerned,’ 
the court should “not apply that law.”199  “Even where . . . a contractual 
choice-of-law provision” exists, “California applies the law of the parties’ 
choosing only after considering the relevant state interests.”200  Thus, courts 
must apply the governmental interest analysis.201 
 
194. Id. at 956. 
195. Id. at 951. 
196. Id.  
197. Id.; see MAJOR LEAGUE RULES, supra note 36, art. XXV (stating that the UPC “shall 
be governed by and interpreted in such a manner as to be effective and valid under New York 
law.”).  
198. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 951. 
199. Id. at 956 (quoting Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 729–30 (Cal. 1967)).  
200. Id. at 957.  
201. Id.  
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Regarding the interpretation of Sullivan, Justice Ikuta contended that 
the majority’s extension of the case, which “establish[es] a general rule that 
California has a superior interest in applying its law to wage-and-hour claims 
that arise within its borders,” is not supported by Sullivan.202  “Sullivan ex-
pressly limited its analysis to the particular facts of the case before it: a case 
involving California overtime law, a California employer, and employees 
residing in Arizona and Colorado.”203  Thus, Justice Ikuta argued that Sulli-
van should be read narrowly and does not imply that its rule would apply to 
out-of-state employers.204  Ultimately, Justice Ikuta concluded “Sullivan 
stands for the proposition that the determination of which state’s law applies 
requires a careful analysis of each relevant state’s law and policies.”205 
Justice Ikuta emphasized the specific steps the court must go through 
to decide which state law applies.206  First, the court “must analyze the con-
tractual choice-of-law provision.”207  If the provision does not govern, the 
court must decide if minimum wage laws and overtime laws of Arizona and 
Florida apply by their terms to nonresident employees who work for nonres-
ident employers.208  Then, the court must “identify relevant laws of each po-
tentially affected jurisdictions” and “determine whether there is a conflict 
between those laws and the resident laws of the parties.”209  If there is a con-
flict, then the court must “compare the amount of each jurisdiction’s interest 
in applying their specific laws to determine whether a true conflict exists 
under the circumstances of the particular case.”210  Under the facts of this 
specific case, Justice Ikuta asserted that the choice-of-law inquiries cannot 
be neatly solved with the generalized rule of the majority, so none of the 
 
202. Id. (citing Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 239–40 (Cal. 2011)). 
203. Id. at 959 (citing Sullivan, 254 P.3d at 239–40). 
204. Id.  
205. Id. at 960.  
206. Id. at 961.  
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
210. Id.  
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classes should be certified.211  Justice Ikuta states that this generalized strat-
egy is contrary to the requirement that California courts undertake the gov-
ernmental interest analysis in every case.212   
2. Practicality 
Justice Ikuta also contended that the majority’s practicality arguments 
were logically reversed because using a generalized rule would actually 
make business practices more impractical for employers and employees.213  
She stated that if the law of the state where the work physically takes place 
always applies, it would require employers to research and comply with var-
ious state laws whenever their employees traveled for short conferences or 
business meetings.214  An employer would be required to research applicable 
state law whenever an employee travels across state lines.215  Justice Ikuta 
claimed the majority’s rule would also place a burden on employees because 
they would no longer be protected by the laws of their resident state or em-
ployer’s state while traveling for work, which would force them to earn less 
money for work travel.216  Thus, Justice Ikuta argued that the more optimal 
solution is to adhere strictly to choice-of-law principles.217  However, in light 
of the justice system’s goal in class certification to “achieve economies of 
time, effort, and expense,”218 the majority’s simplified interpretation of the 
law is more ideal than a rigorous choice-of-law analysis for every class cer-
tification case.219 
 
211. Id. at 962. 
212. Id.  
213. Id. at 963. 
214. Id. at 960. 
215. Id. 
216. Id.  
217. Id. 
218. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note, which explains that “[s]ubdi-
vision (b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, 
effort, and expense . . . .”; see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997) 
(citation omitted). 
219. See generally Senne, 934 F.3d 918. 
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V. KEEPING IT CLASSY: INTERPRETING SULLIVAN BROADLY 
The Ninth Circuit correctly certified each proposed class for three rea-
sons.  First, the majority opinion’s interpretation of Sullivan in applying the 
choice-of-law analysis avoids complications arising from the entanglement 
of state laws.  Second, the practicality of the majority’s general principle is 
superior to a strict governmental interest test in consideration of the burdens 
placed on the employer, the employee, and the overall judicial system.  
Third, the policy behind certifying the class is heavily in favor of the minor 
leaguers.  If the class is broken into individualized claims, these minor 
leaguers will no longer have a legal solution for MLB’s exploitation of their 
time and services.  Thus, the Ninth Circuit was correct in allowing the minor 
leaguers to follow through with their class action lawsuit. 
A. Predominance and Choice-of Law 
In Senne, the majority and dissent disagreed on whether the choice-of-
law inquiries related to the circumstances of this case are enough to over-
come the predominant interest of the state where work was done.220  Justice 
Ikuta argued that the differing circumstances of each class member made it 
too complicated to apply the state law where work was performed to the 
class’s minor leaguers.221  However, under these circumstances, it is highly 
unlikely  that an alien state’s interests would have a stronger interest in ap-
plying their law over the law of the state where work is performed, and thus, 
the majority was correct. 
1. Refuting MLB’s Entanglement of Law Arguments 
MLB argued that choice-of-law complications should prevent the cer-
tification of a class action.  This case consists of players who reside in at 
least nineteen states, who are suing teams that are headquartered in at least 
twenty-two states, relating to work that occurred in three states.222  Thus, it 
is understandable that the states where the players reside, where the teams 
are headquartered, and where the work took place all have an interest in ap-
plying their own laws to this case.  However, the question still remains which 
state has the strongest interest in applying their law or which state would be 
 
220. See generally id. 
221. See id. at 951 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
222. Id. at 960–61. 
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most impaired if the law of another state was applied.223  Under most circum-
stances, the prevailing answer to this question would be the state where the 
work was done.224  If a class is too broad, the minor leaguers would be able 
to address some of these state law complications by narrowing their class, 
just as they did after the denial of their initial class proposal.225 
MLB argued that non-California states have an interest in applying 
their laws to the California class and so forth for the other certified classes.226  
“To evaluate whether a claim seeks to apply the force of a state statute be-
yond the state’s boundaries, courts consider where the conduct that ‘creates 
liability’ occurs.”227  “If the conduct that ‘creates liability’ occurs in Califor-
nia, California law properly governs that conduct.”228  Here, the conduct that 
“creates liability” is the minor leaguers’ participation in unpaid training lo-
cated in California, Arizona, or Florida, so the laws of those states should 
respectively apply.229  Furthermore, in Sullivan, the California Supreme 
Court unambiguously asserted a strong interest in applying its overtime law 
to all nonexempt workers, and all work performed within its borders.230  “Or-
dinarily, the statutes of a state have no force beyond its boundaries.”231  Con-
sistent with a predominance analysis, it would be highly unlikely that any 
 
223. Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 239, 243 (Cal. 2011). 
224. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 935 (majority opinion) (asserting that “a state has a legitimate 
interest in applying its wage laws extraterritorially only in two limited circumstances.”). 
225. See generally Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., No. 14-cv-00608-JCS, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32949, at *49 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2017). 
226. Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants’ Reply Brief on Cross-Appeal at 23–24, 
Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 934 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2019) (Nos. 17-16245, 17-
16267, 17-16276), 2018 U.S. 9th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 525, at *30–31. 
227. Oman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 889 F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th. Cir. 2018); Sullivan, 254 
P.3d at 248; see also RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016). 
228. Oman, 889 F.3d at 1079; Sullivan, 254 P.3d at 248; see also Diamond Multimedia 
Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 968 P.2d 1036, 1060 (Cal. 1999).  
229. Oman, 889 F.3d at 1079; see generally Senne, 934 F.3d 918. 
230. See Sullivan, 254 P.3d at 245–46. 
231. Oman, 889 F.3d at 1079; see N. Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 162 P.93, 94 (Cal. 
1916). 
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other state would have an interest stronger than California regarding work 
done extensively within its borders.232 
MLB also argued that since “Arizona and Florida have among the least 
protective wage laws in the country,” the interests of these states would not 
be impaired when a more protective statute of another state is applied be-
cause the government interest test considers the amount of harm to states.233  
However, this logic is flawed because it considers only the employee in a 
statute governing an employer-employee relationship.  To illustrate, apply-
ing an outside state’s more protective laws to the Arizona class is still harm-
ful to Arizona’s laws because it would ultimately defy the intent of Arizona’s 
legislation to pass less protective statutes.  MLB’s assumption that there is 
no harm in applying a more protective statute is erroneous because it neglects 
to consider the employer as well.  The difference in protection, regardless of 
whether it is more or less, would still affect the interest of the state whose 
laws are not applied.  Here, the interest of the state where work was com-
pleted would still be most impaired by the application of an outside state’s 
laws. 
2. Why Choice-of-Law Does Not Defeat Predominance 
The majority asserted that predominance is not overcome by choice-
of-law inquiries.234  In employment cases, employee differences would not 
eliminate predominance if the “liability arises from a common practice or 
policy of an employer.”235  The same reasoning applies here.  “Although the 
existence of blanket corporate policies is not a guarantee that predominance 
will be satisfied, such policies ‘often bear heavily on questions of predomi-
nance and superiority.’”236  Here, the UPC acts as a blanket corporate policy 
because every player in the MLB system is required to sign it in order to 
 
232. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 933–35. 
233. Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants’ Reply Brief on Cross-Appeal, supra note 
226, at 28. 
234. See Senne, 934 F.3d at 928–37. 
235. Id. at 938 (quoting NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 23:33 (5th ed. 2012)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
236. Id. (quoting In re Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Overtime Pay Litig., 571 F.3d 953, 958 
(9th Cir. 2009)). 
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play.237  The differences between minor league players are not enough to 
undermine predominance because there are no material conflicts of state law 
necessitating individual inquiries that overpower the legal questions com-
mon to the class.238  Additionally, courts generally have the ability to miti-
gate class differences by using its power to require the class definition be 
narrowed.  By allowing the minor leaguers to narrow their class, the court 
makes sure the general legal issue reigns over the differences between each 
class member. 
The majority’s interpretation is the most practical solution.  If a judge 
can assume the state law where the work is completed would apply in most 
scenarios, the judge would avoid a deep dive into outside state statutes, for-
mulating their own interpretation of another state’s statute, or weighing the 
state’s interest in applying its law versus other states.  Allowing a judge to 
interpret an outside state’s statute risks error by the court because the judge 
would lack understanding of the outside state legislature’s intent behind 
passing the statute.  A strict reading of Sullivan requiring a thorough and 
deep dive into another state’s statutes would create chaos in any class action 
case for a judge.  Additionally, it would be outside the scope of a judge’s 
power to go through the statute of every state involved in this case and inter-
pret it without any awareness of the context behind why each state legislation 
passed the statute in the first place.  Accordingly, the majority’s interpreta-
tion makes the judicial process for class actions more efficient by eliminating 
this risk of error. 
B. Practicality of Applying the Law Where Work was Done 
Given the differences in state laws, the determination of which law ap-
plies under these circumstances would have a dramatic impact on interstate 
businesses because employers would need to strategically modify their pol-
icies and hiring processes in order to comply with whichever state law ap-
plies to their traveling employees.  The majority and dissent disagree on the 
practicality of generally applying the law where work is performed.  The 
majority stated that applying the law where work is performed is the most 
practical for businesses and would avoid disadvantaging employees.239  On 
 
237. McDowell, supra note 5, at 9. 
238. Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants’ Reply Brief on Cross-Appeal, supra note 
226, at 26–27. 
239. Senne, 934 F.3d at 932. 
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the other hand, Justice Ikuta stated that applying the law where work is per-
formed is a more impractical option and any issues would be easily remedied 
if an employer paid employees according to the employer’s state laws.240 
1. Ikuta’s Approach is Impractical 
Justice Ikuta’s dissent offers an approach that is impractical.  Ikuta be-
lieves the majority’s concerns would be eased if the state law at issue merely 
requires an employer to pay each of its employees according to the laws of 
the employer’s resident state, even where the employee is working in another 
state.241  Truck drivers and traveling salespeople partake in occupations for 
which complications may arise under the majority’s stance.242  Because 
travel is dispersed, state law protection under these circumstances becomes 
complicated because questions would arise over which state law should pre-
vail.  However, if the court automatically applies the law of the state where 
an MLB Club is located to work outside of that state, it might create unequal 
pay and labor treatment towards minor leaguers spread across different teams 
for practically identical work.  This rule provides competitive advantages to 
teams located in states with lower wage laws.  The UPC binds players to 
their team for seven years, so players have no say on where they play.  Under 
Justice Ikuta’s interpretation, if a player from an Ohio team and a player from 
an Arizona team complete identical work in California for an extended pe-
riod of time, the differing wage laws of Ohio and Arizona create an imbal-
ance in the financial treatment of the two players for the same type of work.  
Under the majority opinion, both players would be subject to California’s 
laws, which avoids this imbalance. 
2. The Practicality of the Majority’s Approach 
If the law of the state where work is not applied, “employers and em-
ployees would [both] be subject to an unworkable scheme.”243  Employers 
would have to obtain the residency of each employee, adjust their wages for 
each employee according to their state of residence, and actively comb 
through each state’s labor laws to ensure they abide by the specific law of 
 
240. Id. at 960 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
241. Id. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. at 932 (majority opinion). 
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that one employee.244  Under this “unworkable scheme,” non-resident em-
ployees working at the same worksite “side-by-side” in the same positions 
would be “owed vastly different minimum wages” and are subject to differ-
ent laws regarding lunch and rest breaks.245  Requiring this tedious and dif-
ficult process would create unfair administrative and business practices that 
would hurt citizens of states with high wage laws or strict labor laws.246  It 
would not be in any state’s interest to put this big of an administrative burden 
on both employers and employees alike.247 
While explaining that the law of the state where work is performed 
should be the law applied, the majority acknowledged that a state has a le-
gitimate interest in applying its wage laws extraterritorially only in two lim-
ited circumstances, neither of which apply in Senne.248  The first circum-
stance is “when a state’s resident employee of that state’s resident employer 
leaves the state ‘temporarily during the course of the normal workday.’”249  
This is reasonable because if an employee works in an outside state fre-
quently enough to be viewed as a normal part of his/her workday, then sub-
jecting the employee to that outside state’s laws aligns with the majority’s 
opinion that the law of the state where work is done should apply.  The sec-
ond circumstance is “when the traveling, resident employee of a domestic 
employer would otherwise be left without the protection of another state’s 
law.”250  This is valid because leaving employees without any protection of 
a state law would dangerously put them at risk of having no claim for any 
injustice stemming from their labor.  Here, the minor leaguers spent not 
hours, but “days or weeks at a time working in a state.”251  Since Senne would 
not be under either circumstance, the law where work is done should apply. 
 
244. See id. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. at 935. 
249. Id. (quoting Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 242 (Cal. 2011)). 
250. Sullivan, 254 P.3d at 246. 
251. See id. at 243. 
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C. Public Policy Behind Maintaining Class Certification 
Public policy perspectives also support the certification of the minor 
leaguer’s classes.  MLB sought class decertification because they would 
want to avoid a heavier financial impact from a class payout.  However, class 
decertification would flatline the claims for many individual minor leaguers. 
1. Why MLB Wants Class Decertification 
MLB saves money by refusing to pay minor leaguers adequate salaries.  
Minor league team owners worry that if MLB has to pay minor leaguers 
more money, then the league could counter these costs by moving the burden 
to its minor league affiliates.252  Accordingly, if the burden of these costs 
ultimately falls on the finances of the minor league, then some minor league 
teams may not survive.253  In the face of a class-action lawsuit, there is po-
tential for a similar result.  A class-action lawsuit would probably place a 
heavy financial burden on MLB’s profits.  A lawsuit of this caliber would 
ensure consistent relief for all members in the minor leaguers’ class.  With 
thousands of players in the Senne class, a certification creates a likelihood 
that MLB’s finances would take a massive hit.  Class certification strength-
ens the minor leaguers’ leverage in settlement negotiations, as a class-action 
payout could reach over tens of millions of dollars.254  However, considering 
MLB is a multi-billion-dollar business, a class-action payout would not 
likely result in the complete demise of the association.  On the other hand, 
class certification is crucial for many minor leaguers, as decertification may 
curtail their pursuit of a legal remedy. 
2. Why Minor Leaguers Need Class Certification 
Senne was filed to create a voice for the thousands of Minor Leaguers 
who were suppressed by MLB’s inhumanely low wages.255  If the class is 
 
252. See Grow, supra note 23, at 1024. 
253. Id. at 1024–25. 
254. See Charles Gibbs, Note, Consumer Class Actions After AT&T v. Concepcion: Why 
the Federal Arbitration Act Should not be Used to Deny Effective Relief to Small-Value Claimants, 
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1345, 1365–67 (2012) (providing examples of multi-million-dollar class ac-
tion payouts). 
255. See generally Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 934 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 
2019). 
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decertified, this voice would be silenced.  Decertifying the class would elim-
inate the opportunity for many players to receive any compensation because 
a player who is required to try his case on his own will likely not be able to 
afford quality legal representation against MLB, an entity with endless re-
sources.  Since MLB team owners pay the salaries of minor leaguers, they 
are incentivized to keep player’s pay “low because minor leaguers do not 
directly contribute to the owners’ main commercial products”—that is, the 
major league teams.256  Senne is minor leaguers’ rare opportunity to fight 
against these harsh wage practices. 
Ironically, MLB’s position is that “being a Minor League Baseball 
player is not a career but a short-term seasonal apprenticeship in which the 
player either advances to the Major Leagues or pursues another career.”257  
Contrary to this definition, players can spend approximately four to six years 
in the minor leagues before even getting a chance to play in a major league 
game.258  Although minor leaguers contribute years of their lives to their re-
spective organizations, MLB still refuses to pay them a respectable rate.  In 
an age where career moves are common, these “short-term seasonal appren-
ticeship[s]” last longer than the working stints of professionals in other in-
dustries.259  This exploitation will only continue unless the minor leaguers 
find leverage through this class action lawsuit.   
Unfortunately for the minor leaguers, they lost even more legal lever-
age moving forward.  The Save America’s Pastime Act largely eliminates 
MLB’s future liability under the FLSA for their minor league pay prac-
tices.260  Minor leaguers were unable “to mount an effective, organized effort 
to” combat MLB’s lobbying efforts to get the act passed.261  By eliminating 
 
256. McDowell, supra note 5, at 7. 
257. Major League Baseball Statement, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL (June 30, 2016), 
https://www.mlb.com/press-release/major-league-baseball-statement-187167466 [https://perma.cc
/AK59-EXHD]. 
258. Gaines, supra note 18. 
259. Major League Baseball Statement, supra note 257; see Employee Tenure Summary, 
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (September 20, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.bls.gov
/news.release/tenure.t01.htm [https://perma.cc/PG8F-L7HD] (stating that the median years of ten-
ure with employers for men aged between 20–24 is less than two years, and for men aged between 
25–34 is less than three-and-a-half years). 
260. Grow, supra note 23, at 1038.  
261. Id. at 1025. 
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legal risks rooted in the minor league business process, the Save America’s 
Pastime Act undercuts a lot of the leverage the minor leaguers hoped to gain 
in Senne.262  This statute makes it substantially less likely that minor leaguers 
will be able to influence MLB in modifying their pay practices.  Therefore, 
proving MLB’s liability through this class action lawsuit and recovering 
damages for past harm may be the only chance for these minor leaguers to 
be fairly compensated. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Baseball is America’s favorite pastime.  However, the recently passed 
Save America’s Pastime Act is hypocritical in its name because it excludes 
the one party that is most meaningful to the game: the players.  Senne v. 
Kansas City Royals Baseball Corporation may be the first and last case of 
its kind due to this recent legislative act.  The Ninth Circuit made the right 
decision in interpreting the choice-of-law principles broadly and keeping the 
class action together.  The majority’s broad application of Sullivan to the 
minor leaguers’ circumstances avoids complications arising from the entan-
glement of state laws.  The law of the state where work is done should apply 
because it is the most practical for the employer, the employee, and the over-
all judicial process.  In addition to giving the minor leaguers a voice, a class 
action would also provide the best method in fairly and efficiently adjudicat-
ing this controversy.  Decertifying the class would prove devastating to mi-
nor leaguers because many players are unable to afford pursuing their own 
individual cases due to the poor financial situations created by MLB.  Ac-
cordingly, if a writ of certiorari were to be granted, the Supreme Court of the 
United States should affirm the Ninth Circuit’s class certification and keep 
the voice of the minor leaguers alive. 
 
 
262. See id. at 1038. 
